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NOTES
BANKRUPTCY’S  GRAY  AREA:  ARE  BANKRUPTCY
COURTS  “COURTS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES”?
Angelo G. Labate*
INTRODUCTION
To declare bankruptcy throughout much of Anglo-American history was
akin to declaring oneself a failure.1  Bankruptcy, therefore, for much of
American history carried a heavy social stigma and was usually reserved for
those willing to take on the economic shame that came with debt reorganiza-
tion.2  By the 1960s, however, evolving social norms surrounding the abstract
ideas of wealth, effort, and success began to erode the negative stigmatization
of debt and bankruptcy.3  Declaring bankruptcy is a common practice today
that affects (or will affect) millions of Americans—and the impact of the
increased filings are felt strongly in the United States Bankruptcy Courts.  As
more individuals and corporations turn to the bankruptcy courts to resolve
common economic problems, ensuring the system remains effective and effi-
cient is of paramount importance.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor
of Arts & Masters of Science in Teaching, Fordham University, 2012 & 2014.  I would like
to thank: my family for their support, Professor A.J. Bellia for his guidance throughout the
writing process, and the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their patient editing help.  A
special thanks to Lauren Peterson, Morgan Elinson, Pian Wong, and Tony Thoman for
teaching me the value of thinking critically many years ago.  All errors are my own.
1 See Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 366,
366–67 (2006).
2 Id.
3 See generally Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 435 (2013) (detailing the historical basis for the stigma surrounding bankruptcy, as
well as its modern decline); see also generally, Steve Rhode, Here Is Exactly Why People Who File
Bankruptcy Are Smart, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2015, 5:33 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/steve-rhode/here-is-exactly-why-peopl_b_7695826.html (describing bank-
ruptcy filings in a positive light, not in the historically negative manner).
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National scandals, such as the massive failures of Enron and Lehman
Brothers,4 might paint a picture that bankruptcy is a corporate tool to
restructure bad debt and escape what is owed, yet the vast majority of bank-
ruptcy filings are personal.5  Financial stressors such as high student-loan
debts, mortgages, or credit card bills can lead many American families down
the road to insolvency.6  The debt accrued by necessary medical procedures
has become the leading cause of personal bankruptcies in the United States.7
Bankruptcy, therefore, is not only an escape valve for corporations and
wealthy individuals, but also a part of the economic reality within our nation
for all classes of society.
That is not to say that corporate bankruptcies do not occur regularly,
nor does it suggest that they are bad for the economy.  In fact, many econo-
mists hail the modern bankruptcy system for allowing corporations to restruc-
ture soundly, prevent layoffs, and better manage assets to emerge from debt.8
Therefore, because corporations and the average American family both rely
on this system, its efficiency and effectiveness are vital to our modern
national economic reality.
Congress, recognizing the importance of commercial and individual
bankruptcy matters to the national economy, created a separate court within
the federal system to ensure the efficient adjudication of bankruptcy cases.
Initially, Congress intended to grant original jurisdiction over all bankruptcy
cases to a specialized court—similar to how the Federal Circuit operates
today.9  However, the Supreme Court struck down parts of the 1978 Bank-
4 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, In Lehman’s Demise, Some Shades of Enron, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
12, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com//2010/03/12/in-lehmans-demise-some-shades-
of-enron/.
5 See March 2015 Bankruptcy Filings Down 12 Percent, U.S. COURTS (Apr. 27, 2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2015/04/27/march-2015-bankruptcy-filings-down-12-per-
cent (showing that of the several million bankruptcy filings since 2011 the overwhelming
majority have been for non-business insolvencies).
6 Top 10 Reasons People Go Bankrupt, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Mar. 24, 2015, 4:23
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simple-thrifty-living/top-10-reasons-people-go-_b_
6887642.html.
7 Id. (noting that a significant majority of those filing due to medical expenses also
had insurance, “thus debunking the myth that only the uninsured face financial
catastrophes”).
8 See generally Thomas H. Jackson & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy and Economic Recov-
ery, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, U. PA. (2013) (explaining the importance of the bank-
ruptcy system to the national economy); see also generally Michelle J. White, Economic
Analysis of Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law 56–69 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11536, 2005), http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~miwhite/Handbook-proofs
.pdf (describing the economic motivations and empirical data surrounding bankruptcy
decisions, as well as the overall economic impact of those decisions on a macro and per-
sonal level).
9 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 213, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978); see also David S. Kennedy & Tisha L.
Federico, If the United States Bankruptcy Court Is Not a “Court of the United States,” Then What Is
It?, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 859, 862 (1998) (describing the original language of the United
States Code prior to the 1984 amendments).
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ruptcy Act in Northern Pipeline, making many of the reforms inoperative.10
Congress responded by passing a new law creating an Article I bankruptcy
court as a unit within the United States District Courts that would receive
cases by referral.11  The judges of the new bankruptcy court would be
deemed “judicial officers” of the district court.12  Congress, in response to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline, did not scrap the bank-
ruptcy court entirely, but instead found a legislative fix—thus showing its
commitment to the efficient running of bankruptcy matters within the fed-
eral system.
The reforms, in light of the Supreme Court declaring much of the 1978
Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional, created one issue that threatens the effi-
cient running of the system—and therefore the entire purpose of the
reforms.  The newly created bankruptcy courts were deemed to be a “unit of
the district court[s]” of the United States.13  Thus, the bankruptcy courts
began to operate in a gray area.  They were neither a stand-alone court nor
fully a district court.  The nebulous status of the bankruptcy courts is not just
a matter of theoretical interest; it a matter of great practical concern.  This
concern arises due to Congress’s repeated use of the phrase “courts of the
United States” throughout the United States Code, and the inconsistent
treatment of the bankruptcy courts with respect to the phrase.14  Thus, deter-
mining whether the bankruptcy courts are “courts of the United States” has
practical import, as inconsistent treatment threatens the integrity and effi-
ciency of the federal bankruptcy system.
The Supreme Court has never directly taken up the issue, but the
United States Courts of Appeals have attempted to define the status of the
bankruptcy courts for the past several decades.15  In particular, the circuit
courts have taken three approaches to this question: (1) explicitly holding
that the bankruptcy courts are not “courts of the United States”; (2) implic-
itly treating the bankruptcy courts as falling within the definition while not
explicitly deciding the issue; or (3) explicitly holding that the bankruptcy
10 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
11 Kennedy & Federico, supra note 9, at 863.
12 Id. at 882 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 336 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (1994)). 
13 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
14 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6001(4) (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); 28 U.S.C.
§ 451 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
15 See Sixth Circuit Joins the Split on Whether Bankruptcy Courts Are ‘Courts of the U.S.’, AM.
BANKR. INST., http://www.abi.org/newsroom/daily-wire/sixth-circuit-joins-the-split-on-
whether-bankruptcy-courts-are-%E2%80%98courts-of-the-us (last visited Jan. 29, 2016)
[hereinafter Sixth Circuit Joins the Split] (describing the most recent jurisprudence on the
on-going circuit split); see also Kennedy & Federico, supra note 9, at 864–69 (describing the
origins of the circuit split dating back to the early 1990s).
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courts are “courts of the United States.”16  The resulting circuit split has cre-
ated a dual status within the federal system for bankruptcy courts, thus jeop-
ardizing not only the efficiency of the courts but also their legitimacy.  A slim
majority of circuit courts counts the bankruptcy courts as “courts of the
United States,”17 while the minority does not grant this status.18  The practi-
cal effect is that in some circuits certain statutes are applicable within a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, whereas in other circuits these same statutes would be
inapplicable to the same case.  Depending on the circuit, statutory procedu-
ral tools such as sanctions, fee shifting, and declaratory judgments might not
be available to bankruptcy judges, which jeopardizes their ability to effectively
manage a growing docket of bankruptcy matters.  As the current system was
created to efficiently handle the nation’s bankruptcy cases, this status quo is
untenable.
This Note seeks to evaluate the circuit split regarding the status of bank-
ruptcy courts and propose a solution to the problem through an efficiency-
based lens.  Part I lays out a brief history of bankruptcy in the United States
and the current bankruptcy system.  Part II then outlines the circuit split
within the courts of appeals as to the proper definition of “courts of the
United States.”  Part III will analyze the statutory language, the United States
Code, and the relevant historical context to determine if the bankruptcy
courts qualify as “courts of the United States.”  This Part argues that the bank-
ruptcy courts are “courts of the United States.”  Part IV will discuss, from an
efficiency-based lens, the policy rationale supporting this legal conclusion.
The Note concludes by suggesting that Congress or the Supreme Court
should intervene and legitimize the bankruptcy courts as “courts of the
United States.”  This conclusion is reached by analyzing the United States
Code in a consistent and uniform manner with common tools of statutory
interpretation—with attention paid to history, Congressional purpose, and
general principles of efficiency.
16 See Grossman v. Wehrle (In re Royal Manor Mgmt., Inc.), 652 F. App’x 330, 341–42
(6th Cir. 2016).
17 See, e.g., In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 102–05 (3d Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that the bankruptcy court, as a unit of the district court, comes within the meaning of
§ 451); Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 895 n.8 (7th Cir. 2000) (pointing to a bankruptcy
court’s authority to sanction under § 1927); Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs. (In re
Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc.), 931 F.2d 222, 230–31 (2d Cir. 1991) (analyzing the bank-
ruptcy court’s § 1927 sanction on the merits, rather than holding it lacked power to issue
sanction).  These cases all hold, implicitly or explicitly, that bankruptcy courts come within
the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 451.
18 See, e.g., Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd.), 40 F.3d 1084, 1086
(10th Cir. 1994); IRS v. Brickell Inv. Corp. (In re Brickell Inv. Corp.), 922 F.2d 696, 699
(11th Cir. 1991); Miller v. Cardinale (In re Deville), 280 B.R. 483, 494 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2002).  These cases all hold that the bankruptcy courts do not fall within the meaning of
“courts of the United States” found in 28 U.S.C. § 451.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE US BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
To better understand how the current bankruptcy court operates within
the overall federal system, and just what Congress could have meant by its
repeated use of the phrase “courts of the United States,” it is important to
look at the evolution of the bankruptcy system.  By tracing the changes to the
bankruptcy system over time, through an efficiency-based lens, past inade-
quacies can be gleaned.  Analysis of these inadequacies will help illuminate a
solution to the disagreement underlying the ongoing circuit split surround-
ing the status of the bankruptcy courts.
A. Bankruptcy in the Founding Era
The framers of the Constitution recognized the importance of bank-
ruptcy when they granted Congress the power to “establish . . . uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”19  The inclu-
sion of the Bankruptcy Clause within the powers of Congress was part of a
greater attempt to federalize the economy in the wake of the failure of the
Articles of Confederation.20  The Federalist Papers also defended a uniform
federal bankruptcy power as being necessary for the economic health of the
new republic.21  The appearance of the bankruptcy power among the more
general commerce powers highlights that the Founders saw not only how
important the power was to the emerging economy, but also how potentially
dangerous discriminatory and differing state laws could be.22  With little
debate, and only one vote against, the clause was added to the Constitution—
yet Congress chose not to exercise this power immediately.23
Over a decade after ratification, Congress would pass the first of many
federal bankruptcy laws—the Bankruptcy Act of 1800.24  Based heavily on
English norms,25 the first act was creditor-friendly and had no provision for
individual debtors to file on their own.26  Procedurally the act carried over
the English practice of using commissioners to handle the bankruptcy mat-
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
20 See Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 319, 340 (2013).
21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 221 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClel-
lan eds., 1999) (“The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately
connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the
parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different States, that the expediency
of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.”).
22 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 13 (1995).
23 Id.
24 David Haynes, History of Bankruptcy in the United States, BALANCE (Oct. 31, 2016),
https://www.thebalance.com/history-of-bankruptcy-in-the-united-states-316225.
25 Tabb, supra note 22, at 6–12.
26 Haynes, supra note 24; see also Lubben, supra note 20, at 340 (describing the
merchant class’s desire for a federal bankruptcy scheme in the wake of the Articles of
Confederation).
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ters, who would then report to the district courts.27  By 1803, however, the
shortcomings of the law led to its total repeal, leaving bankruptcy law to the
regulation of the various state legislatures.28
B. From the New Republic to Civil War
From the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 until 1841, Congress did
not attempt to involve itself in the administration of bankruptcy law.  The
Supreme Court, however, throughout this four-decade interlude routinely
hindered the powers of the states effectively to administer bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.29  In the ensuing years the nation experienced periods of severe
economic hardship, and the states alone, in the absence of federal bank-
ruptcy law, could not adequately handle the economic crises.30  Thus, in the
early republic, bankruptcy law was neither effective nor uniform, betraying
the Founders’ earlier intentions.
In the next several decades, Congress began to exercise its bankruptcy
power, but only intermittently in times of economic hardship for the nation.
In 1841, in a late response to the Panics of 1837 and 1839, Congress passed a
short-lived federal bankruptcy law, which finally allowed for debtors to peti-
tion voluntarily for debt relief.31  Commissioners would again play a role in
the system under this law, but their use was not mandatory.32  After little
more than a year, Congress repealed the 1841 Act, and once again state law
filled the void created by a lack of federal bankruptcy law.33  During the sub-
sequent years of economic prosperity Congress felt little pressure to attempt
another go at bankruptcy reform.34
The economic crises brought about by the end of the Civil War once
again put focus on bankruptcy reform at the federal level.  This next federal
attempt, which was a response to the Panic of 1857 and the economic col-
lapse in the wake of the Civil War, would eventually fail as past measures
did.35  The Act, however, did attempt to correct some of the issues seen in
previous reform attempts, as it placed the district courts in charge of bank-
ruptcy matters (as “courts of bankruptcy” rather than relying upon commis-
sioners), allowed for corporate bankruptcies, and made allowances for both
voluntary and involuntary bankruptcies.36  These reforms were the closest to
the modern bankruptcy system, and while they eventually failed, their repeal
27 Id. at 363.
28 See Haynes, supra note 24.
29 See Tabb, supra note 22, at 15.
30 See id. at 16.
31 See Lubben, supra note 20, at 360–63 (discussing Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5
Stat. 440 (repealed 1843)).
32 Id. at 363.
33 Id. at 365–66.
34 See Tabb, supra note 22, at 19.
35 Id.
36 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting An Act to Establish a Uniform Sys-
tem of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 176, § 1, 14 Stat. 517 (1867)).
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in 1878 made them the longest lasting federal law on bankruptcy at the
time.37
C. Movement to a Permanent System
The past failures of temporary solutions as short-term responses to eco-
nomic catastrophe finally led to the creation of the first permanent federal
bankruptcy law in 1898.38  Two major goals of the new federal system were to
keep fee expenses low and to allow for the quick discharge of debt that indi-
viduals were unable to pay.39  For the first time Congress showed that it
intended for a federal bankruptcy scheme to remain as the uniform system
for the country, as it did not add an expiration date to the Act.40  Congress
finally broke free of the past laws’ outdated English roots, and a system simi-
lar to that in use in modern times emerged.41  The district court appointed
referees to handle all bankruptcy matters more efficiently.42  Under the 1898
Act, the district courts at first only used the referees for administrative pur-
poses, but soon the courts began to rely upon them for legal matters as their
dockets became crowded with a slew of bankruptcy cases.43  While it was
heavily amended as part of the New Deal, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 would
remain in force as the basic framework for most insolvency proceedings until
1978.  Congress’s attitude toward the entire system began to change as bank-
ruptcy became a tool for the debtor rather than the creditor, opening up the
process and allowing thousands of Americans to discharge crushing debt and
thereby help the overall economy.44  A sure sign of the Act’s necessity (and
relative success compared with past efforts) was the tens of thousands of pro-
ceedings that the district court and referees dealt with each year after its
passage.45
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ushered in a “modern era of liberal debtor
treatment,”46 and while the system remained in place for nearly a century, it
was adapted to better respond to the Great Depression.47  These reforms—
implemented after several careful studies of bankruptcy proceedings—
included many procedural changes to the administration of bankruptcy
37 See id.
38 An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States,
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Chandler Act (Bankruptcy Act, Amendments of
1938), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549.
39 See Lubben, supra note 20, at 385–86.
40 Id. at 386.
41 Id. at 387.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See Tabb, supra note 22, at 24.
45 See Lubben, supra note 20, at 390.
46 Tabb, supra note 22, at 24.
47 Lubben, supra note 20, at 392 (discussing the New Deal’s Chandler Act as heavily
amending the 1898 scheme).
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cases.48  Eventually, in the 1960s, changes to procedure resulted in the pro-
mulgation of bankruptcy procedural rules by the Supreme Court.49  Con-
gress conducted another series of studies in the 1970s, which resulted in the
controversial bankruptcy reforms of 1978 (the source of the current circuit
split).50  Congress’s focus on procedure and its careful study of the issue (at
the taxpayers’ expense) suggests that it cared deeply about the efficient run-
ning of the bankruptcy system in the nation, in order to fully realize the
Founders’ goals in exercising the Bankruptcy Clause to ensure that uniform
federal laws effectively governed the national economy.
D. The Modern Era Framework and Reforms
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197851 was the first major federal bank-
ruptcy act not to stem from a major economic panic in the nation,52 and was
the product of nearly a decade of intensive study by the congressionally
formed Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, bipartisan
negotiations, and several draft bills.53  Legal scholars have described the pre-
1978 field as a patchwork of bankruptcy amendments and court opinions
interpreting the laws—leading at times to an ineffective administration of
justice.54  Thus, Congress acted as dissatisfaction mounted in the 1960s and
not as a reactionary measure to any negative economic distress.55
The 1973 Commission created to investigate how best to reform the
bankruptcy process focused upon inefficiencies within the system.56  Focus
points included: administrative waste, the rapid increases in the number of
consumer bankruptcies over the years, lack of uniformity in treatment of
debtors, and abusive or negligent behavior by those involved in the bank-
ruptcy process (including lawyers and judges).57  By 1977 a House Report
used commission findings to hone in on the impaired process by looking at
the low status and lack of independence of bankruptcy judges, as well as the
vagueness in the Bankruptcy Code.58  The House sought to transfer more
judicial power to the bankruptcy judges, while the Senate resisted expansive
48 Tabb, supra note 22, at 29–31.
49 Id. at 31.
50 Id. at 32.
51 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
52 See Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV.
941, 942 (1979); see also Tabb, supra note 22, at 32.
53 See Klee, supra note 52, at 942–57.
54 See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 47, 61 (1997).
55 See id. at 61–67 (describing the criticisms of the 1898 Act and subsequent amend-
ments as an impetus for change rather than an economic disaster).
56 Id. at 67–69; see also Tabb, supra note 22, at 35 (“A strong effort was made in the
1978 Act to improve the administration of bankruptcy cases.”).
57 Posner, supra note 54, at 68 (describing the major complaints that the bankruptcy
commission noted about the system as it was in 1973).
58 Id. at 70.
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jurisdiction.59  A compromise between the House and the Senate gave the
bankruptcy judges some independence, but blocked their Article III status.60
From the legislative history it would seem that Congress wanted bankruptcy
judges to have sizeable judicial powers and to be able to operate as indepen-
dent judicial officers in order to increase efficiency.
The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, while still the major framework today,
was nonetheless challenged very soon after its enactment.  This legal chal-
lenge led to a major crippling of the system’s overall structure, as a plurality
of the Supreme Court held that the grant of original jurisdiction over all
bankruptcy matters to an Article I bankruptcy court was an unconstitutional
usurpation of Article III judicial power.61  In 1984, Congress reformed the
act so that it fell in line with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Northern Pipe-
line.62 The decision did not allow Congress merely to sever the unconstitu-
tional parts of the court system that the 1978 Act had set up—Congress had
to scratch the entire bankruptcy court and begin again.63  The Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA) sought to remedy
this issue by creating new bankruptcy judgeships as  “units of the district
court” which heard bankruptcy matters only by reference from the district
courts.64  These new bankruptcy judges would have the power to enter judg-
ment on “core” bankruptcy matters, while deferring to the district court for
final judgment on non-core matters.65  Since instituting this law, Congress
from time to time has added to the number of existing judgeships as a reac-
tion to the increasing number of bankruptcy cases that make it onto the
docket.66  The BAFJA is the source of the issue described in this Note, as it
repealed and replaced much of the 1978 Act without addressing whether
these new units of the district court would in fact be “courts of the United
States.”
In the ensuing years after BAFJA, Congress made several more substan-
tive reforms and funded another commission to study the bankruptcy system.
The newest Commission Report in 1997 found that there was not enough
done to deter abuses within the system.67  The report went even further to
59 Id.
60 Id. at 73 (describing the final bill as partly being a compromise between House and
Senate desires on the status of the bankruptcy judge).
61 Tabb, supra note 22, at 34–35.
62 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality
opinion); see also Melissa B. Jacoby, Superdelegation and Gatekeeping in Bankruptcy Courts, 87
TEMP. L. REV. 875, 878 (2015).
63 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion); see also Tabb, supra note 22,
at 38–39 (describing the relationship between the Northern Pipeline decision and the con-
gressional response).
64 Tabb, supra note 22, at 39.
65 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 157(b)(2), 98 Stat. 333, 336)).
66 Id. at 43.
67 Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 487–88 (2005).
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recommend Article III status for the bankruptcy judges—a recommendation
that Congress rejected.68  The last major overhaul of the bankruptcy system,
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA), still focused on the national well-being of the economy and effi-
ciency in its reform goals.69  These reforms, however, did not address the
status of bankruptcy courts, leaving them stuck in the gray area of the current
circuit split.
Going forward, the number of bankruptcy filings show no sign of slow-
ing down, and in fact studies have shown that nearly “fifteen times as many
American households could benefit from bankruptcy” but do not file.70  As
more and more Americans turn to bankruptcy as a solution to economic
hardship, it is important that the bankruptcy system is run efficiently and
smoothly.  While Congress has routinely re-tooled the Bankruptcy Code as
inefficiencies present themselves, it has also routinely ignored the circuit split
on the bankruptcy courts’ status in the federal system.  This inaction makes
one wonder if Congress believes that it has run out of options other than
creating an Article III court and is hesitant to create such a court.  Or Con-
gress might feel that any action would bring further confusion and ambiguity
to the bankruptcy system already in place.  It is also entirely feasible that
given the difficulty in adding items to Congress’s agenda, members of Con-
gress would rather resolve the issue judicially.  The rest of this Note will, in
light of the above historical background, attempt to work through the quag-
mire that is the status of bankruptcy courts in order to find a realistic solution
to the problem.
II. THE SPLIT ON “COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES”
In June of 2016, the Sixth Circuit reinvigorated the debate regarding the
status of bankruptcy judges within the federal system by ruling that the bank-
ruptcy courts are indeed “courts of the United States.”71  The case, like many
before it, involved the power to issue sanctions for multiplying the proceed-
ings unjustly under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.72  The Second, Third, and Seventh Cir-
cuits had previously held that the bankruptcy courts enjoy status (or at least
powers) under the U.S. Code as “courts of the United States,” while the
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have disagreed.73
68 Id.
69 See Zachary Price, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 39
HARV. J. LEGIS. 237, 237 (2002) (noting that bipartisan efforts were motivated by the grow-
ing numbers of bankruptcy cases courts were handling).
70 Id. at 245.
71 See Grossman v. Wehrle (In re Royal Manor Mgmt., Inc.), 652 F. App’x 330, 341 (6th
Cir. 2016).
72 See Sixth Circuit Joins the Split, supra note 15; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
73 See Sixth Circuit Joins the Split, supra note 15.
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A. Closer Look: The Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in favor of bankruptcy courts qualifiying as
“courts of the United States” looked to the reasoning of its sister circuits
heavily.74  The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits all have held that bank-
ruptcy courts operate as “courts of the United States” for purposes of Title
2875—with only the Third Circuit giving specific reasoning.76
An early decision finding that a bankruptcy court can act under a statute
limiting action to “courts of the United States” is In re Cohoes Industrial Termi-
nal, Inc.77 The Second Circuit in that matter held that a bankruptcy court
can issue sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which is a power reserved only to
the “courts of the United States.”78  The court overturned the sanction, but
not because of any lack of power on the part of the bankruptcy court.  It
found that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion under § 1927, not that
it was using a power it never had in the first place.79  The court did not offer
any defense of its actions; it merely asserted that the bankruptcy court had
the statutory authority under § 1927 to sanction vexatious litigation.80  In
fact, the Second Circuit simply applied the same standard it usually applied
to § 1927 inquiries.81
In a similar fashion, the Seventh Circuit, in passing, declared that bank-
ruptcy courts enjoy authority to sanction under § 1927.  In a footnote in
Adair v. Sherman, the Seventh Circuit asserted that bankruptcy courts have
authority to sanction under that statute.82  The court did not discuss “courts
of the United States” explicitly, mentioning only that a bankruptcy court can
sanction attorney behavior that comes within § 1927’s prohibition on vexa-
tious litigation.83
The most recent decision prior to Royal Manor was in the Third Circuit,
which oddly enough found that the bankruptcy courts actually are not
“courts of the United States” but enjoy the same powers because they are a
unit of the district courts which are expressly given that status by statute.84
The Third Circuit’s holding brings bankruptcy courts within the definition of
“courts of the United States”—defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451—through their
association with the district courts.85  In practice, the Third Circuit’s decision
74 In re Royal Manor, 652 F. App’x at 341.
75 Id.
76 See In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 105 (3d Cir. 2008).
77 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs. (In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc.), 931 F.2d
222 (2d Cir. 1991).
78 Id. at 230; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (granting power to “courts of the United
States” to sanction vexatious litigation).
79 See In re Cohoes, 931 F.2d at 231.
80 See id. at 230.
81 Id. (citing Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986)).
82 Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 895 n.8 (7th Cir. 2000).
83 Id. (asserting that bankruptcy judges have the authority under § 1927 to sanction
attorneys if they have engaged in vexatious or unreasonable conduct).
84 In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 105 (3d Cir. 2008).
85 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2012).
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to bring bankruptcy courts within the reach of the definition of “courts of the
United States” allows the bankruptcy courts to administer bankruptcy matters
efficiently by making full use of the Judicial Code.
The Sixth Circuit looked upon its sister circuits as well as its own unpub-
lished opinions related to the matter of attorney sanctions to hold that the
bankruptcy courts did have authority to act under § 1927.86  In the past, a
Sixth Circuit court upheld a bankruptcy court’s sanctions without ever explic-
itly addressing whether it was a “court of the United States.”87  The court
then looked to a recent order of the Sixth Circuit to remand for reconsidera-
tion of the appropriateness of sanctions, without ever questioning whether
the bankruptcy court had the power to issue these sanctions in the first
place.88  These past holdings, along with the persuasive reasoning of its sister
circuits, led the Sixth Circuit to the conclusion that bankruptcy courts are
“courts of the United States.”
B. Closer Look: The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
While a majority of circuits have found that the bankruptcy courts have
power to act as “courts of the United States,” that majority is a slim one.  The
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have each found that the bankruptcy
courts do not qualify under the definition of “courts of the United States”
found in 28 U.S.C. § 451.
Since 1992, the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that bankruptcy
courts lack authority to act statutorily under grants of power to “courts of the
United States.”  By looking at the history surrounding the definition of
“courts of the United States,” the Ninth Circuit noted that the bankruptcy
courts were deleted from § 451.89  Thus, with no express grant of power in
§ 451, and the implied restriction through deletion, the Ninth Circuit pro-
hibited a bankruptcy court from exercising power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a),
which would allow the court to waive fees.90  Following that reasoning, when
it came time to review a bankruptcy court’s authority to act under § 1927 the
Ninth Circuit once again held that the court had no such authority.91  The
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel did not even entertain § 1927 as a
possible way to uphold sanctions.  The panel dismissed the appeal because
“the Ninth Circuit does not regard a bankruptcy court as a ‘court of the
86 Grossman v. Wehrle (In re Royal Manor Mgmt., Inc.), 652 F. App’x 330, 341 (6th
Cir. 2016).
87 Id. (citing Maloof v. Level Propane Gasses, Inc., 316 F. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (noting the court’s inherent and statutory authority to issue
sanctions)).
88 Id. (citing Followell v. Mills, 317 F. App’x 501, 513–14 (6th Cir. 2009)).
89 See Perroton v. Gray (In re Perroton), 958 F.2d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 1992).
90 See id.
91 See Miller v. Cardinale (In re Deville), 280 B.R. 483, 494 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002).
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United States.’”92  The reasoning was then upheld on appeal by the Ninth
Circuit.93
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit expanded upon the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit to bring the two sister circuits into accord with one another.  The
Tenth Circuit found that the legislative history was very persuasive and sup-
ported a holding that the bankruptcy courts are not “courts of the United
States” for the purposes of § 451.94  Pointing to the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, the court noted that originally § 451 did include the bankruptcy
courts, and that the 1984 amendments removed any language referencing
the bankruptcy courts.95  Senate commentary provided some insight as to
why, which the court believed related to the holding in Northern Pipeline.96
Alternative arguments have been entertained by the court, such as the Bank-
ruptcy Clause contemplating the creation of federal courts, § 1927 being able
to stand apart from § 451 as they do not make explicit references to one
another, and § 451 referencing “courts in which judges hold office during
good behavior.”97  However, without going into why these arguments ulti-
mately failed (or at least fail in the eyes of the Tenth Circuit), the legislative
history persuaded the court to hold that § 1927 (and by implication § 451)
does not contemplate the federal bankruptcy courts.98
The Eleventh Circuit, when confronted with a bankruptcy court’s ability
to award fees, also held that a bankruptcy court was not a “court of the
United States”; however, its reasoning was slightly different.  Instead of rely-
ing upon the legislative history of § 451, as the Ninth and Tenth Circuits did,
the Eleventh Circuit found that as non-Article III courts the bankruptcy
courts could not be “courts of the United States.”99  To bolster this finding
the court relied upon the fact that the statute in question, 26 U.S.C. § 7430,
included references to the Tax Court and the Claims Court.100  The Eleventh
Circuit held that the explicit inclusion of these non-Article III courts indi-
cated a lack of authority as “courts of the United States” without Congress’s
express inclusion.101  The court further explained that as a non-core pro-
ceeding, the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to award fees.102
92 Id.
93 See Miller v. Cardinale (In re Deville), 361 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2004).
94 Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd.), 40 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir.
1994).
95 Id.
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 See id.
99 See IRS v. Brickell Inv. Corp. (In re Brickell Inv. Corp.), 922 F.2d 696, 699–701 (11th
Cir. 1991).
100 Id. at 701.
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1139 n.7
(11th Cir. 1990)).
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C. Closer Look: The Eigth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit avoided the question altogether in In re Clark.103
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the question of whether a court could sanc-
tion did not turn on whether a court fit the definition of “courts of the
United States,” but rather on the broad sanctioning powers found through-
out the Judicial Code.104  The Eighth Circuit approach, however, does not
really provide a useful tool for solving the issue with other code sections that
also use the term “courts of the United States.”  This line of reasoning trans-
forms the question into a statute-by-statute inquiry of which powers are cap-
tured via the inherent powers of the bankruptcy court and which are not.
Approaching the problem in this manner inefficiently allocates judicial
resources and energy towards answering the same question repeatedly.  A
brightline approach is much more useful to ensure the efficient and uniform
running of the bankruptcy system.  Therefore, in light of this reasoning’s
running contrary to efficiency, and thus the purpose of the bankruptcy sys-
tem, it will not be discussed in later portions of this Note.
III. BANKRUPTCY COURTS ARE “COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES”
This Part will demonstrate that the bankruptcy courts are “courts of the
United States.”  While arguments can be made that the courts’ inclusion in
that definition is not necessary for the functioning of the courts, or not
granted by the plain language of § 451, these arguments ultimately fail.  Vari-
ous traditional indicators of statutory meaning all point towards bankruptcy
courts’ inclusion in the meaning of “courts of the United States.”  By looking
at the statutory relationship between the bankruptcy and district courts, spe-
cific mentioning of bankruptcy courts in the Criminal Code, and the overall
backdrop of congressional intent, it becomes clear that the bankruptcy
courts are part of the definition of “courts of the United States.”
A. Bankruptcy Courts Are a Unit of the District Courts
While the words “bankruptcy courts” are not included within the defini-
tion of “courts of the United States” found in § 451, the overall court of
which the bankruptcy judges are a part is enumerated.105  The district courts
of the United States are explicitly mentioned within the statutory text as
being “courts of the United States.”  The bankruptcy courts by designation
are each a “unit of the district court.”106  The bankruptcy judges have the
ability to hear and decide core bankruptcy matters through the jurisdiction
103 See Walton v. LaBarge (In re Clark), 223 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2000).
104 Id. at 864.
105 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2012) (listing district courts among the enumerated courts but
omitting the bankruptcy courts).
106 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (explaining that “[i]n each judicial district, the bankruptcy
judges in regular active service shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the
bankruptcy court for that district.” (emphasis added)).
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granted to them via the district court.107  Employing textualist tools of statu-
tory interpretation leads to the conclusion that bankruptcy courts are “courts
of the United States.”
The phrase “unit of the district court,” when given its ordinary meaning,
leads to bankruptcy courts being “courts of the United States.”108  According
to the Oxford English Dictionary, “unit” means “[a]n individual thing or per-
son regarded as single and complete but which can also form an individual
component of a larger or more complex whole.”109  The plain-meaning defi-
nition of “unit” leads to an understanding that while the bankruptcy courts
are an identifiable and distinct entity, they cannot be severable from the
“whole,” which is the district court, for their jurisdiction.  Therefore, as a part
of the whole, the bankruptcy courts are a piece of a “court of the United
States.”  As a piece of a “court of the United States” it would not make sense
to then say that the definition of the phrase does not encompass the bank-
ruptcy courts.  Courts should also presume that the legislature did not “waste
words when enacting laws”110 and interpret the language of a statute to avoid
“linguistic surplusage.”111  Reading “unit of the district court” in any way
other than meaning “distinct part of a complete whole” would make Con-
gress’s words inactive—other meanings would simply have the two courts as
separate entities.
Bankruptcy courts are courts of limited jurisdiction—as they derive the
power to hear core bankruptcy matters from the district court—but it should
not follow that they all lack similar procedural powers of the district court.
As courts, they should possess powers inherent to courts, and as  “unit[s] of
the district court,” they should have similar powers to that court, except
where Congress has explicitly removed such powers.  Extending status as a
107 By creating the modern bankruptcy system in this manner, Congress was reacting to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline, which held Congress’s initial plan of
granting exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction to a separate bankruptcy court unconstitutional.
See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
108 The method endorsed time and again by the Supreme Court, as the starting point
of statutory interpretation, is to give “the words used their ordinary meaning.” See David A.
Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1565 (1997) (quoting Moskal v.
United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)); see also Larry M. Eig, Statutory Interpretation: Gen-
eral Principles and Recent Trends, CONG. RES. REP. 7 (2011) (noting that dictionaries can
serve as tools for ordinary meaning interpretation).
109 Unit, ENG. OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/defini-
tion/unit; accord Unit, CAMBRIDGE ENG. DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/unit (defining it as “a single thing or a separate part of something
larger”); Unit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/unit (defining it as “a single thing, person, or group that is a constituent of a whole”).
110 Stephen M. Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33 CAMP-
BELL L. REV. 115, 122 (2010) (quoting Damien M. Schiff, Purposivism and the Reasonable
Legislator: A Review Essay of Justice Stephen Breyer’s Active Liberty, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1081, 1087–88 n.37 (2007)); see also Eig, supra note 108, at 13–14.
111 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
98 (2006).
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“court of the United States” would not expand jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts to hear non-bankruptcy matters—nor would it unconstitutionally
grant exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction to an Article I court.  All it would do
is provide authority for the bankruptcy courts to manage their growing
docket efficiently by granting them the ability to use statutorily created pro-
cedural tools.  Title 11 of the U.S. Code allows for the bankruptcy court to
“issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title.”112  It would seem odd to empower a
court in one area of the Code, while simultaneously undercutting that same
court in another area of the Code—through an omission.  Furthermore, the
definitional section of the chapter on procedure of Title 28, empowers “[f]or
purposes of this chapter . . . any court which is created by Act of Congress in
a territory and is invested with any jurisdiction of a district court.”113  As
bankruptcy courts are units of the district court and are vested with jurisdic-
tion via the district court, it should follow that the bankruptcy courts possess
procedural tools that the district courts have.
It is not just the fact that Congress made the bankruptcy courts part of
the district court that favors their inclusion within the definition of “courts of
the United States.”  One way courts determine the meaning of statutory lan-
guage is by examining how the legislature uses that language in other laws.114
Throughout the U.S. Code, Congress has included bankruptcy courts within
its meaning of “courts of the United States” in statutes related to the opera-
tion of the federal judiciary.  Organs of the federal judiciary treat the bank-
ruptcy courts as “courts of the United States” under their statutory grants of
power.  For instance, 28 U.S.C. § 620 creates the Federal Judicial Center.115
The Center’s purpose is “to further the development and adoption of
improved judicial administration in the courts of the United States.”116
Many of the publications they publish concern the bankruptcy courts.117
The Center must always, by statute, have one bankruptcy judge on its
board.118  Similarly, § 462 empowers the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts to decide where sessions of the “courts of
the United States” will be accommodated.119  A strict reading of “courts of
the United States,” as the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held in
112 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
113 28 U.S.C. § 1869(f) (2012).
114 See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341,
374–75 (2010) (describing the canon of the presumption of consistent usage and its appli-
cation to phrases used in multiple statutes).
115 28 U.S.C. § 620.
116 Id. § 620(a).
117 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Publication and Video Catalogue, http://www.fjc.gov/library/
fjc_catalog.nsf (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
118 28 U.S.C. § 621; see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., General Information about the FJC, http://
www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openagent&url_r=pages/102 (last visited Nov.
25, 2016) (listing the current board as including Chief Judge C. Ray Mullins of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia).
119 28 U.S.C. § 462(a).
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the past, would compel the absurd result of the Center and Administrative
Office not having authority over the bankruptcy courts.  Further, the defini-
tion of “courts” included in the same chapter makes no mention of the bank-
ruptcy courts, once again suggesting that their inclusion within the district
courts makes them a “court” for purposes of the Code.120  Similarly, 28 U.S.C
§ 2104 decrees that when reviewing state court judgments, the Supreme
Court decision has “the same effect, as if the [state] judgment or decree
reviewed had been rendered in a court of the United States.”121  Interpreting
this statute, then, raises the question: Is there a gray area between federal and
state judgments that bankruptcy courts occupy?  To avoid confusion, apply-
ing the presumption of consistent meaning throughout Title 28 would help
clear up the language and avoid unintended consequences122—as it seems
that in actual practice bankruptcy courts are awarded “courts of the United
States” status in some instances but not others.
Not only does the ambiguity in language present issues for the procedu-
ral powers of the courts, but it could potentially cloud the ethics surrounding
the bankruptcy courts as well.  “[O]fficer[s] or employee[s] of the Adminis-
trative Office,” for instance, “shall not engage directly or indirectly in the
practice of law in any court of the United States.”123  A strict reading again of
the term would seem to compel an absurd result—exempting this ethical
rule from application in the bankruptcy courts.  When the U.S. government
is interested in lost or destroyed records of “courts of the United States,”
necessary steps under the “direction of the judges of such court” must be
taken.124  Again, strict application of the minority circuit reasoning would
compel that bankruptcy court records would not fall within the language of
the rule.
The U.S. Code should be read consistently so that phrases and words
carry the same meaning throughout.125  Selectively reading the Code to
include bankruptcy courts within “courts of the United States” for administra-
tive duties of the judiciary, but not in some circuits for procedural powers,
leads to an inconsistency.  Inconsistencies should be avoided, as they lead to
120 Id. § 610.
121 Id. § 2104.
122 See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1417 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that while the usual presumption of
consistent use is reserved to operation within a single statute, it has broader application in
that it can be used for related statutes (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233
(2005) (plurality opinion))); Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Sch., 412 U.S.
427, 428 (1973) (per curiam); see also Eig, supra note 108, at 14–15 (noting that in the past
the Supreme Court has endorsed a “broad[ ] ‘established canon’ that similar language
contained with [sic] the same section of a statute be accorded a consistent meaning.” (cit-
ing Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479, 501 (1998))).
123 28 U.S.C. § 607.
124 Id. § 1735.
125 See Scott, supra note 114, at 374–75 (2010) (noting the existence of a general canon
of “construing statutes in pari materia” which stresses the use of related statutes to interpret
phrases in a consistent manner).
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inefficiencies.  A better approach is to view the bankruptcy courts as part of
the “courts of the United States” through its inclusion in the district court,
and then limit its powers only where Congress has expressly done so.  Addi-
tionally, by applying the plain-meaning definition of “units of the district
court,” the language of “courts of the United States” would not produce an
absurd result126—in fact, it would do the opposite.
B. Bankruptcy Courts Are Enumerated in Title 18
Whereas in Title 28 Congress—likely in a hasty attempt to respond to
Northern Pipeline—left out bankruptcy courts, in Title 18 bankruptcy courts
are listed as “courts of the United States.”127  Title 18 was amended during
the 1978 bankruptcy reforms to be more consistent with the new chapter
eleven bankruptcy provisions.128  Unlike the Judicial Code, the Criminal
Code was not amended in the wake of Northern Pipeline.129  From the
unchanged 1978 revisions to the Criminal Code, it is clear that Congress
intended for the bankruptcy courts to be “courts of the United States.”
As used earlier to discuss the consistent reading of “courts of the United
States” within the Judicial Code, the presumption of consistent meaning
should be employed to interpret the phrase used in 18 U.S.C. § 6001 and 28
U.S.C. § 451 in a uniform manner.130  Justice Scalia, in United States v. Castle-
man, noted that while the interpretive presumption is normally used within
one enactment, it can be used in interpreting two statutes that are related.131
The two statutes in question are both definitional sections pertaining to the
federal judiciary defining the same phrase: “courts of the United States.”  As
the similarity between the two is so strong, using Justice Scalia’s reasoning in
Castleman would be appropriate.  Congress’s omission of the bankruptcy
courts in Title 28 should be viewed in light of the fact that it left its 1978
amendment intact in Title 18.  The gap in language—created by the hasty,
unexpected, and necessary response to Northern Pipeline—should be filled by
the language left behind in Title 18.
126 The only exception to the plain-meaning canon of construction is when ordinary
meaning would compel an “absurd result.”  Here, applying the plain meaning would not
compel an absurdity, and would instead give import to Congress’s intent to make the bank-
ruptcy courts part of the district courts. See Eig, supra note 108, at 42.
127 Kennedy & Federico, supra note 9, at 869–70.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 870.
130 See Eig, supra note 108, at 14–15 (noting existence of broadly established canons in
federal jurisprudence).
131 United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1416 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); see also Scott, supra note 114, at 374–76 (discussing
the use of the presumption of consistent usage in related statutes, and the strong endorse-
ment of the canon by state legislatures).
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C. Legislative Purpose Favors Extending Status to Bankruptcy Courts
Interpreting the Judicial Code to encompass bankruptcy courts within
the meaning of “courts of the United States” would also fall in line with con-
gressional intent.  The legislative history highlights that Congress originally
intended to grant exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction to the bankruptcy judges
and, in the original 1978 reforms, did not use “unit of the district court”
language.132  In response to the Supreme Court declaring this grant of exclu-
sive jurisdiction to a non-Article III court unconstitutional, Congress—over a
two-year period—sought a legislative fix to keep the bankruptcy courts opera-
ble in a constitutional fashion.133  Congress debated between creating an
Article III court and cutting back the Article I court’s jurisdiction134—ulti-
mately the broad exclusive jurisdiction was cut back and the bankruptcy
courts became a “unit of the district court.”  Congress, however, did not
intend to completely curtail the system it originally crafted, as the 1984
reforms were only meant to conform to the holding of Northern Pipeline.135
Part of the impetus for the 1978 reforms was to make the bankruptcy
system more accessible and efficient; thus, it follows that in amending the
reforms Congress intended to keep the same goals.  The legislative
workaround Congress devised was to embed the bankruptcy court within the
federal district court system.136  An interpretation of “unit of the district
court” as meaning a part of the larger functioning whole would therefore be
consistent with the original plan.  Further, it would also be consistent with
the original 1978 plan to find that the bankruptcy units of the district court
are a part of that “court of the United States” and therefore share its status.
Congress limited jurisdiction in conformity with Northern Pipeline so that the
bankruptcy courts derived their jurisdiction from the district courts—it did
not completely start from scratch and create a totally new system.  Reading
the omission of the new bankruptcy courts as explicitly removing the status of
being a “court of the United States” from the federal bankruptcy courts does
not mesh with the surrounding historical circumstances of the reform’s
enactment.  A better reading of the history is that it was a messy—albeit nec-
essary—reaction to try to salvage the brand-new bankruptcy system in what
Congress felt was the best way possible.  Omission may have been a way to
tread lightly to appease a Supreme Court that was, in Congress’s view, hostile
to the originally intended system.137
132 Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 529, 529–31 (1998) (describing how Congress did not choose an Article III court after
Northern Pipeline and the negative impacts of that choice).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 529.
135 Jacoby, supra note 62, at 878 n.21.
136 See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
137 This reading of history is also consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 6001(4) (2012) retaining
the language of the 1978 reforms by listing bankruptcy courts as falling within the defini-
tion of “courts of the United States.” 
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D. Arguments Against Extension Fail
Several arguments have been leveled against the proposition that bank-
ruptcy courts should be included in the definition of “courts of the United
States.”  First, it can be argued that, as bankruptcy courts are not Article III
courts, they are properly excluded from the list of “courts of the United
States.”138  However, this argument again ignores that the bankruptcy judges
are “judicial officers of the United States district court established under Arti-
cle III of the Constitution.”139  It also ignores that the Criminal Code
includes the bankruptcy courts among the “courts of the United States.”
Therefore, this argument would afford higher status to the bankruptcy courts
when they handle criminal sanctions than when they issue civil orders for
attorneys’ fees—an untenable result.
Second, an argument can be made that the 1984 reforms of the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act, in response to Northern Pipeline, intentionally deleted
bankruptcy courts from the list.140  Again this argument ignores the fact that
Title 18 retained the language and was left untouched during the 1984
reforms.  It is sensible to believe that if Congress were attempting to com-
pletely change the status of the bankruptcy courts it would have done so con-
sistently.  This argument also does not solve the apparent inconsistencies
within the Judicial Code when Congress does use the phrase “courts of the
United States”—as it occasionally affords this status to bankruptcy courts for
what seems like administrative purposes and convenience.
The more palatable approach is that of the Second, Third, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits—all of which have recognized the status of the bankruptcy
courts as “courts of the United States.”  No circuit, however, has provided
much reasoning as to why it afforded this status upon the bankruptcy courts.
Each just simply acted as if the bankruptcy courts are obviously “courts of the
United States.”  This approach is the more consistent approach in attempting
to create an efficient and effective bankruptcy system, and is more consistent
with the history surrounding the phrase, other code sections, and the consis-
tent meaning throughout the Judicial Code.
IV. WHY SHOULD THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS BE TREATED AS
“COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES?”
While the circuit courts focus on the statutory language and power of
courts, given the nature of the role they must perform it is worth considering
in addition why the status of the bankruptcy courts within the federal court
system should matter.  Part III focused on why legally the bankruptcy courts
are “courts of the United States”; this Part will focus on why the courts’ inclu-
sion within the meaning of the phrase is sound and efficient policy.  These
138 IRS v. Brickell Inv. Corp. (In re Brickell Inv. Corp.), 922 F.2d 696, 701 (11th Cir.
1991).
139 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).
140 See Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd.), 40 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th
Cir. 1994).
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policy considerations support a judicial interpretation of the U.S. Code that
affords bankruptcy courts status as “courts of the United States.”  As its histor-
ical development indicates, the federal bankruptcy system is intended to uni-
formly and efficiently carry out an important economic and social good.  The
split over whether bankruptcy courts are “courts of the United States” threat-
ens that uniform application of bankruptcy law.  Without uniformity, the
overall efficiency, legitimacy, and socio-economic policy goals of the bank-
ruptcy system are also challenged.  By affirming the bankruptcy courts’ status
as “courts of the United States,” the judicial system can better check against
this erosion over time.
The efficient running of the courts and a swift administration of justice
are bedrock principles of the federal court system.141  The number of cases
being heard in the federal system has continued to grow; yet the number of
judges necessary to meet demand has not.  Litigation, especially in the bank-
ruptcy sphere, has not slowed much since then.142  Repeated amendments to
the modern federal bankruptcy system could be seen as recognition of the
strain the increasing number of bankruptcy cases has placed on the district
courts.143  Thus, when looking closely at the way in which the bankruptcy
courts fit within the overall system, the analysis should occur through an effi-
ciency-based lens.
The bankruptcy system is relied upon by a variety of individuals and cor-
porate entities, from distressed families with mounting unexpected medical
expenses to the largest investment banks in the United States.144  Congress
took action in 2005 in an attempt to ensure that access to bankruptcy courts
remains an efficient process, as any unnecessary delays have real world finan-
cial burdens on insolvent families and businesses.145  These reforms focused
on the substantive law of bankruptcy to prevent abuse of the system.
141 See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 (explaining that the purpose of the rules is “to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding.”);
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (explaining that the purpose of the rules is “to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (stating
that the rules shall be interpreted for “fairness in administration, and to eliminate unjustifi-
able expense and delay”); FED. R. EVID. 102 (stating that the rules shall be construed to
“eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay . . . and [to secure] a just determination”).
142 See U.S. COURTS, 2012 REPORT SHOWS MORE REPEAT BANKRUPTCY FILERS (Oct. 22,
2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/10/22/2012-report-shows-more-repeat-bank-
ruptcy-filers (indicating an increase in bankruptcy filings, especially repeat filings, and a
total of 1.1 million personal consumer debt driven filings).
143 See Tabb, supra note 22, at 37; see also Posner, supra note 54, at 68 (describing the
commission’s focus on the increasing number of consumer bankruptcies).
144 See generally Arturo Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus
Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253 (2006) (discussing various corporate bankrupt-
cies); David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a
National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741 (2009) (discussing personal medical bankruptcy fil-
ings); Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 175 (2007)
(discussing consumer credit card debt induced bankruptcy).
145 See generally Jensen, supra note 67.
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Judges, through several powers, both inherent and statutorily given,
have the means to ensure that the courts are managed in an efficient manner
and that litigation abuse is discouraged and curbed.  Common ways of achiev-
ing this goal are issuing sanctions, enhancing damage awards, and shifting
attorneys’ fees.  Courts can look at the behaviors or motivations of litigants
and decide that action is needed to send a deterrent message to a particular
litigant and subsequent litigants.
By denying bankruptcy courts the status of “courts of the United States”
judges lack necessary procedural tools to deter abusive and inefficient behav-
ior in bankruptcy proceedings.  Many statutes that allow for shifting of attor-
neys’ fees or sanctions are located in code sections that restrict use to “courts
of the United States.”146  Unless bankruptcy courts are included within this
definition, bankruptcy judges would lack case management powers granted
by these code sections that other courts within the federal system have.  Cur-
rently the bankruptcy system is split, with some circuits viewing the bank-
ruptcy courts as having status as “courts of the United States” and others
denying status—thus, creating an odd situation where procedural manage-
ment and deterrence tools are available to some bankruptcy judges but not
others.
Serial filers are a problem in the bankruptcy system, especially in recent
years for mortgagees after the 2008 financial crisis.  The 2005 reforms of the
BAPCPA intended in large part to tackle this issue by substantively changing
much of the law.  Ultimately, however, these reforms were ineffective in solv-
ing the serial filing and abuse problem.147  For instance, recently in just one
Florida district court eighty-five individuals were declared abusive serial filers,
with some filing as many as seven bankruptcy petitions.148  While continuing
to petition the court for relief from high mortgage payments, most people
cease payments—further endangering their financial standing.149  Florida is
in the Eleventh Circuit, a court that does not recognize bankruptcy courts as
being “courts of the United States,” and thus it does not recognize its author-
ity to use statutory tools branded as being reserved for such courts.  The
serial filer problem illustrates why courts should be given the full arsenal of
procedural tools to manage their dockets, as it is not clear that Rule 11 alone
can effectively handle the multitude of behaviors that courts will encounter
146 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
147 See Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown on Repeat Chap-
ter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 241, 242 (2015) (criticizing the reforms as failing
to crackdown on the repeat filer problem identified by President George W. Bush: “[T]oo
many people have abused the bankruptcy laws . . . . [T]he new law will also make it more
difficult for serial filers to abuse the most generous bankruptcy protections.”); see also AM.
BANKR. INST., SERIAL BANKRUPTCY A 20-YEAR STUDY OF UTAH FILERS (Feb. 2006), http://www
.abi.org/abi-journal/serial-bankruptcy-a-20-year-study-of-utah-filers.
148 See Susan Taylor Martin, Tampa Bay Judges Crack Down on Serial Bankruptcy Filers,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 21, 2015), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/realestate/
tampa-bay-judges-crack-down-on-serial-bankruptcy-filers/2234543.
149 See id.
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(after all, why have separate statutes outlining sanctions if Rule 11 is enough
for all circumstances?).150
A concrete example of the real world consequences of inefficiencies
within the bankruptcy system is the fact that most small business filings are
not done in federal bankruptcy courts.151  Actual and perceived inefficien-
cies, such as higher costs and longer proceedings, have driven struggling
small businesses outside the federal system and toward state insolvency
laws.152  While this shift might be a good thing in the long run, it runs con-
trary to Congress’s exercise of its constitutional power to uniformly regulate
bankruptcy laws.  And any applause for the shift ignores that it is occurring
because the system is perceived to be failing.  To aid the efficient running of
the system and boost the court’s legitimacy, the bankruptcy courts should be
empowered with all necessary procedural authority to administer their core
bankruptcy matters.
As the Judicial Code contains multiple instances of the phrase “courts of
the United States,” the bankruptcy courts in several circuits would lack more
than just a statutory power to issue sanctions for behaviors—the courts would
also lack basic procedural tools like the declaratory judgment.  “Courts of the
United States” can issue declaratory judgments by using the statutory author-
ity of 28 U.S.C. § 2201.153  Declaratory judgments provide a way for judges to
efficiently manage bankruptcy matters; yet again, from a strict reading of the
statute and under the minority circuit view, it is not readily available for
use.154
Bankruptcy is not just an important legal tool for individuals and busi-
nesses, it is also vital to the national economy—thus it serves as a socio-eco-
nomic good that should be protected.  The bankruptcy system can react to
handle the financial fallout of a national investment bank collapsing—which
affects the national economy.155  Bankruptcy can allow for an insolvent small
business to restructure its debt and escape total failure156—saving jobs,
150 See generally Janet Eve Josselyn, The Song of the Sirens—Sanctioning Lawyers Under 28
U.S.C. § 1927, 31 B.C. L. REV. 477 (1990) (describing the distinctness of the § 1927 sanc-
tion, as opposed to inherent or other rule-based sanctions).
151 Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State
Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 255–57 (2009) (explaining that small businesses are increas-
ingly turning to less burdensome and costly alternatives offered by state law).
152 Id.
153 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012) (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . .
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.”).
154 The practical means to get around this apparent bar on declaratory judgments is to
refer judgment to the district court to issue it on the bankruptcy court’s behalf.  Again, this
extra step cuts against the purpose of the modern bankruptcy system, which is to efficiently
handle all core bankruptcy matters for the district courts. See Kennedy & Federico, supra
note 9, at 876.
155 Rosalind Z. Wiggins et al., The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview, YALE SCH.
MGMT. (Oct. 1, 2014), http://som.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/001-2014-3A-V1-Leh
manBrothers-A-REVA.pdf.
156 See Morrison, supra note 151.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL412.txt unknown Seq: 24  4-MAY-17 9:30
1838 notre dame law review [vol. 92:4
improving the economies of local communities, and preserving choice for
consumers.  And it can even help the average American who has fallen on
hard times due to predatory loans, mounting credit card bills, or unavoidable
medical debts.  Thus, it is vitally important to ensure that the bankruptcy
scheme not only remains part of the federal court system, but is efficiently
run.
CONCLUSION
While it appears that bankruptcy courts are “courts of the United States”
for the purposes of Title 28 of the U.S. Code, the courts currently lack that
status in several circuits.157  There are three possible ways of resolving this
disharmony in the circuits: Congress can clarify its language, Congress can
redesign the bankruptcy system, or the Supreme Court can address and
resolve the split.  Immediate action would be welcome from either branch158
to ensure that the already overburdened federal court system has the ability
to address the growing bankruptcy needs of the nation through a procedur-
ally strong bankruptcy court system.
The likelihood, realistically, of resolution by congressional re-wording of
the definitional section of § 451 to include bankruptcy courts as “courts of
the United States” is quite low.  The split in the circuits has existed for nearly
three decades, and Congress has not seen a need to act.  Since the split is so
narrow, though, it would be inappropriate to attempt to read any endorse-
ments into this congressional silence.159  However, given that the bankruptcy
laws have been reformed during this time160 and with no attempt to provide
guidance on this particular issue, it is doubtful going forward that Congress
will decide to clarify the language in Title 28.
The Supreme Court can also step in and clarify the language of the
Code by resolving the circuit split.  In doing so, the above reasoning, as well
as that of the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, would lead the
Court to include the bankruptcy courts within the meaning of the phrase
“courts of the United States.”  However, even if the Supreme Court rejects
the arguments presented within this Note, there could be a silver lining.  It
157 See, e.g., Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd.), 40 F.3d 1084, 1086
(10th Cir. 1994); IRS v. Brickell Inv. Corp. (In re Brickell Inv. Corp.), 922 F.2d 696, 701
(11th Cir. 1991); Miller v. Cardinale (In re Deville), 280 B.R. 483, 494 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2002) (all holding that the bankruptcy courts do not fall within the meaning of “courts of
the United States” found in 28 U.S.C. § 451).
158 The Supreme Court could act by granting certiorari to the next properly filed case
that raises this issue.  Congress, on the other hand, can begin reforming the law on its own
without any precondition for action.
159 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV.
67 (1988) (providing an overview of different views of congressional silence and problems
that arise in its application).
160 See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 67.
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took a Supreme Court decision161 to put Congress on notice to reform
unconstitutional parts of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, and it might take
another Supreme Court decision denying this status to the bankruptcy courts
to act as the motivational spark to make Congress deal with the issue it cre-
ated back in 1984.  During this same time of congressional silence, the
Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to confront the issue head on,
casting doubt on if it will do so in the foreseeable future.
Recently, however, bankruptcy law (and its supposed abuses by the
wealthy) was a major presidential campaign issue,162 possibly indicating that
some change could be on the horizon.  History shows that this is likely, as for
almost our entire history the American bankruptcy system has been a work in
progress.163  Congress might take on bankruptcy not just in light of the new
Administration’s campaign promises but because there is still more to be
done on this work in progress.  Small businesses still continue to take advan-
tage of state insolvency laws, rather than the federal system, because of per-
ceived inefficiencies that make the federal route look wasteful from a time
and cost perspective.164  Health insurance continues to be an issue in the
nation, as millions are uninsured or underinsured, thus likely leading to the
trend of medical expense bankruptcies growing in the future—further clog-
ging the strained courts with bankruptcy litigation.165  Corporations are turn-
ing more towards hedge funds and other investment vehicles as a means of
restructuring failing businesses—Congress could turn its attention to this
shadow bankruptcy system as a means to regulate this non-transparent busi-
ness trend.166  Possibly as Congress acts to fix the inadequacies of BAPCPA, it
would also take into account that many of these inefficiencies can be reme-
died by giving the bankruptcy courts more procedural teeth.  While unlikely,
this might lead them down the road of clarifying the language of what it
means to be a “unit of the district court” or a “court of the United States.”
Even more radically, Congress might even decide that it is time to seriously
161 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
162 See Siobhan Fenton, Presidential Debate: Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump’s First Clash-
Full Transcript, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/first-presidential-debate-full-transcript-read-hillary-clinton-donald-trump-
a7332081.html (President Donald Trump described his use of the bankruptcy laws as
“tak[ing] advantage of the laws of the nation because [he] is running a company,” and
throughout the debate discussed how he would close loopholes to make the system fairer).
163 See generally Lubben, supra note 20; Tabb, supra note 22.
164 See Morrison, supra note 151, at 256.
165 See, e.g., Aaron E. Carroll, Underinsurance Remains Big Problem Under Obama Health
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/upshot/underin-
surance-remains-big-problem-under-obama-health-law.html; Emily Drooby, New Survey
Finds 30 Million Americans Are ‘Underinsured’, AOL NEWS (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.aol
.com/article/news/2016/11/30/new-survey-finds-30-million-americans-are-underinsured/
21616937/.
166 See Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1612–19
(2009) (explaining shadow banking, the creation of a shadow bankruptcy system, and the
need for regulation).
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consider proposals to make an Article III bankruptcy court—which would rid
us of the issue of clarifying the meaning of “unit of the district court”
altogether.167
Any one of these courses of action would help to resolve the circuit split
and bring uniformity within the bankruptcy system.  While it might just seem
like a semantic issue now, having an increasingly burdened bankruptcy court
system that partially lacks statutory procedural authority can lead to practical
difficulties.  Already in circuits that do not grant “courts of the United States”
status to bankruptcy courts, judges lack the power to sanction attorneys that
multiply and delay proceedings.  Coupled with a growing number of bank-
ruptcies due to medical bills and the 2008 housing crisis, courts’ inability to
deter such behavior is problematic going forward.  Bankruptcies will con-
tinue, and unless Congress or the Supreme Court acts to correct the dishar-
mony in the circuits, this problem of words can, over time, evolve into a
practical impediment to the health of our bankruptcy system—and thus the
economic health of the nation.
167 See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 132, at 530 (explaining that the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission also recommends an Article III court taking the place of the current
regime); Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1155 (2015) (reassessing the lack of bankruptcy courts’ Article III powers in light of its
sound reasoning).
